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I. INTRODUCTION
From the romantic days of untilled prairie to the established farms
of Nebraska’s modern life, the people of the plains have always trea-
sured their land.  They know that a person’s land is a vital part of her
identity.1  Although today’s urbanites might have difficulty grasping
this concept,2 history clearly illustrates the connection between land
and identity.  American Indians were tied to their land.3  Everything
from their religion to their way of life was indelibly intertwined with
the land around them.4  The ancients of the Near East were no differ-
ent.  The Judeo-Christian tradition’s attention to a “promised land”
demonstrates how engrained the notion of land is with identity.5  The
law recognizes this connection as a fundamental principle of human
flourishing.6  Takings Clause jurisprudence demonstrates how Ameri-
can law is designed to protect this connection.7  Land is serious busi-
ness tied to serious rights.  When confronted with issues that affect an
individual’s right to land, a court must take great care to get every
element of legal analysis right.
The Nebraska Supreme Court recently faced one such issue.  After
a great deal of debate in the Unicameral8 and on the national political
stage, a group of litigants questioned the State’s right to acquire cer-
1. For an overview of the relationship between personal identity and land, see ED-
WARD C. RELPH, PLACE AND PLACELESSNESS (Allen J. Scott ed., 1976).
2. Id.
3. LUTHER STANDING BEAR, LAND OF THE SPOTTED EAGLE 247 (1933) (“The American
Indian is of the soil, whether it be the region of forests, plains, pueblos, or mesas.
He fits into the landscape, for the land that fashioned the continent also fash-
ioned the man for his surroundings.”).
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Genesis 12:7; Exodus 6:8; Leviticus 20:24; Deuteronomy 31:20.
6. See generally Gregory S. Alexander, Property’s Ends: The Publicness of Private
Law Values, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1257 (2014) (explaining the connection between
public and private land ownership in terms of human flourishing).
7. Id.; see also Horne v. Dep’t. of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (2015) (evidencing the
Court’s reverence for property by applying the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
to personal property). See generally Loretto v. Manhattan Teleprompter CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (demonstrating the Court’s respect for property
by holding a permanent physical occupation a total elimination of property
rights).
8. The Nebraska legislature is composed of one group of lawmakers, called the Uni-
cameral. UNICAMERAL INFO. OFFICE, NEBRASKA LEGISLATURE, INSIDE OUR NA-
TION’S ONLY UNICAMERAL 1 (2015), http://nlcs1.nlc.state.ne.us/epubs/L3300/H001-
2015.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/4RK4-3XFG].  Nebraskans adopted the Unicam-
eral in 1934 to reduce the cost of government and increase its productivity. Id.
To keep national politics out local elections, the Unicameral is a nominally non-
550 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:548
tain landowner’s property through the power of eminent domain.
Landowners, angry about losing certain “sticks” in their “bundle” of
property rights,9 partnered with environmentalists to combat the
State’s cooperation with a Canadian oil company to build the Keystone
XL Pipeline through Nebraska.  The goal of the odd coalition was to
preserve Nebraska ecosystems and reduce American dependence on
unclean energy.10  Randy Thompson, Susan Luebbe (now Susan
Straka), and Susan Dunavan, a group of Nebraska taxpayers,11 filed
in the District Court of Lancaster County to protect the rights of all
Nebraskans from an unconstitutional eminent domain procedure.12
The issue climaxed with the decision’s appeal to the Nebraska Su-
preme Court in Thompson v. Heineman.
By asking the Nebraska Supreme Court to decide whether Legisla-
tive Bill 1161 (L.B. 1161) unconstitutionally delegated eminent do-
main powers, the plaintiffs in Thompson presented a constitutional
issue that affects hundreds of Nebraskans’ substantial property rights
and, in effect, their right to flourish.  Despite the outcome’s tragic ef-
fect on certain landowners’ property rights, this Note will outline how
the minority opinion applied Nebraska’s law correctly, and therefore
the case’s ultimate result was right.  In Part II, this Note summarizes
the Nebraska Supreme Court’s holding in Thompson v. Heineman and
provides a historical background of both the provision in Nebraska’s
constitution that requires a “super-majority”13 to render legislation
partisan body. Id. at 2.  However, as the legislation involved in Thompson sug-
gests, national politics are not easily removed from local decisions.
9. Over the last century, American jurisprudence has compared American property
rights metaphorically to a “bundle of sticks.” See Anna di Robilant, Property: A
Bundle of Sticks or a Tree?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 869, 877 (2013).  Like a bundle of
sticks, each property comes with a “bundle” of distinct entitlements. Id. at 878.
In this context, the right-of-way for the oil pipeline at issue in Thompson is sim-
ply one “stick” in the “bundle” of rights the Nebraska landowners own.
10. See Thompson v. Heineman, 289 Neb. 798, 803, 857 N.W.2d 731, 740.
11. While the Nebraska Supreme Court does not mention the plaintiffs’ full names,
their names are listed in Judge Stacy’s opinion for the Nebraska District Court of
Lancaster County.  Thompson v. Heineman, CI12-2060, 2014 WL 631609 (Neb.
Dist. Ct. Feb. 19, 2014).
12. Thompson, 289 Neb. 798 at 810, 857 N.W.2d at 744.
13. I refer to Nebraska’s requirement for a five judge concurrence as requiring a
“supermajority.”  While there is no official designation for the type of vote the
Nebraska State Constitution requires for judicial review, legal academics from
other jurisdictions with similar requirements have labeled it a “super-majority”
vote. See, e.g., Jonathan L. Entin, Judicial Supermajorities and the Validity of
Statutes: How Mapp Became a Fourth Amendment Landmark Instead of a First
Amendment Footnote, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 441, 442 (2001) (describing the
Ohio constitution’s former supermajority requirement). The court in Thompson
also uses this designation. Thompson, 289 Neb. at 804, 857 N.W.2d at 739.  How-
ever, writers have also referred to the requirement as the “five judge” rule. See
Paul W. Madgett, The “Five Judge” Rule in Nebraska, 2 CREIGHTON L. REV. 329
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unconstitutional14 and Nebraska’s standing law.  Part III goes on to
analyze the law’s application in the insufficient-majority15 and minor-
ity opinions.  First, this Note will describe how the minority’s explana-
tion understands and protects Nebraska’s law on standing better than
the insufficient-majority opinion does.  Next, this Note will explore
what the insufficient-majority intended to accomplish with their opin-
ion.  It will go on to describe how the insufficient-majority’s reasoning
may be mere dicta.  Finally, this Note will explain that the minority’s
opinion on the Nebraska constitution’s supermajority requirement
mirrors how the Court has applied the provision in the past.  This
Note will ultimately provide a guide for how the insufficient-majority’s
opinion fits in to Nebraska’s law on standing.
II. BACKGROUND
The context of the Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision in Thomp-
son v. Heineman is vital to analyzing the insufficient-majority and mi-
nority opinions.  The complicated legal and political dispute that led to
the plaintiffs’ case in Thompson presents motivating factors for the
plaintiffs, and explains the judges’ consternation.  While the law be-
hind its outcome is convoluted at best, the history of the supermajority
provision in Article V of Nebraska’s constitution and the development
of Nebraska’s law on standing help to make sense of the opinion.  Both
summarizing the facts of the case and detailing the historical progres-
sion of the relevant Nebraska law are necessary to appreciate how the
insufficient-majority radically departed from the traditional law of
standing in Nebraska.
A. Political Plaintiffs: A Summary of Thompson v. Heineman
While Thompson addresses several complex issues of Nebraska
legislative and constitutional law, the context of the plaintiffs’ case is
as informative as the development of Nebraska law to the Nebraska
(1969); William J. Riley, Comment, To Require that a Majority of the Supreme
Court Determine the Outcome of Any Case Before It, 50 NEB L. REV. 622 (1970).
14. NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2 (“No legislative act shall be held unconstitutional except
by the concurrence of five judges.”).
15. Even naming the four-judge opinion in Thompson is contentious.  Judge Con-
nolly, writing the four-judge opinion, would have me call it the “majority” opinion.
Thompson, 289 Neb. at 847, 857 N.W.2d at 766 (“But the four judges who have
determined that L.B. 1161 is unconstitutional, while a majority, are not a
supermajority . . . .” (emphasis added)).  Conversely, Chief Justice Heavican, writ-
ing for the minority, would assert the term “plurality” is more appropriate. Id. at
848, 857 N.W.2d at 767 (minority opinion of Heavican, C.J.,) (“According to the
plurality, all that is now required for standing to challenge the constitutionality
of a statue is a tax receipt and a cause.” (emphasis added)).  Throughout this
Note, I will refer to the four-judge opinion as the “insufficient-majority” to respect
the ambiguity.
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Supreme Court’s decision.  National environmental and energy poli-
cies as well as global economic forces are at play between the parties
and, perhaps, even in the minds of the judges.  As discussed below, to
understand the case an individual must review the economic and envi-
ronmental factors that influence public opinion and understand both
Nebraska’s constitutional provisions and the legislation Thompson
addresses.
1. Popular Background
Humanity has an oil addiction.  In 2014, global consumers used
92.4 million barrels of petroleum and other liquid fuels per day, and
the demand is expanding.16  However, experts estimate that 1,492.9
billion barrels of proven oil reserves were available worldwide at the
end of 2014.17  At the same time, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) reported that 26% of greenhouse gas emissions in the
United States come from the use of fossil fuel for our cars, trucks,
ships, trains, and planes.18  Environmental interests clearly run
against construction of a pipeline promising to increase emissions.
However, when the legislation leading to the action in Thompson was
debated in the Unicameral, crude oil’s per-barrel cost was rapidly in-
creasing.19  Consequently, politicians at the time of the decision were
advocating the development of domestic oil reserves.20  Conflict was
bound to arise.  Environmental interests allied with those of landown-
ers hesitant to give up one of the sticks in their bundle of property
rights.21  The fight against oil and eminent domain gave birth to a
16. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK SEPTEMBER 2015 2
(2015).
17. OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves, 2014, ORG. OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORT-
ING COUNTRIES, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm [https://
perma.unl.edu/NW9M-8RHA].
18. Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions [https://perma.unl
.edu/A46L-F857].
19. In 2011, crude oil’s average cost was over $100 per barrel. See 2011 Brief: Brent
Crude Oil Averages over $100 per Barrel in 2011, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.: TO-
DAY IN ENERGY (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=
4550 [https://perma.unl.edu/7BKK-98M9].
20. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Obama Shifts to Speed Oil and Gas Drilling in U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/us/politics/15ad-
dress.html?_r=0.
21. Mitch Smith, Defenders of Tradition in Keystone Pipeline Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/23/us/defending-family-farm-tradi-
tions-in-battle-against-keystone-pipeline.html?_r=0 (describing family farms
fighting the pipeline to continue the legacy of their family farms); see also News
Tagged #KXL Pipline Info, BOLD NEBRASKA, http://boldnebraska.org/tag/kxl-pipe-
line-info/ [https://perma.unl.edu/WKP2-H7CT] (providing articles with environ-
mental and legal reasons the Keystone XL Pipeline should not traverse
Nebraska).
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political movement.22  Neither Nebraska’s Unicameral nor her courts
could escape it.
2. Case Background
These issues came to a head in Thompson v. Heineman.23  In 2008,
TransCanada negotiated with President Barack Obama and the gov-
ernment of Nebraska to construct the Keystone XL Pipeline through
the State of Nebraska.24  Originally, TransCanada planned for the oil
pipeline to traverse Nebraska’s ecologically sensitive Sandhills re-
gion.25  After considerable political pressure, Governor Dave Heine-
man called a special session of the legislature to amend Nebraska’s
eminent domain statute26 because it did not have specific provisions
governing the construction of oil pipelines.27  Nebraska’s Unicameral
enacted the Major Oil Pipeline Siting Act (MOPSA) in 2011.28
MOPSA required the Public Service Commission (PSC) to approve
construction of major oil pipelines in Nebraska.29  The PSC is an en-
tity the Nebraska State Constitution created to regulate common car-
riers, like railroads.30  Two of MOPSA’s legislative purposes were to
protect “Nebraskan’s property rights and the State’s natural re-
sources.”31  However, MOPSA explicitly did not apply to pipelines that
had pending applications with the United States Department of State
at the time MOPSA was enacted, like the Keystone XL Pipeline.32
The situation changed when President Obama rejected TransCan-
ada’s application to build a transnational pipeline through the United
States.33  The rejection meant TransCanada’s application was no
22. Dave Domina’s platform for his Senate campaign was adamant opposition to the
construction of TransCanada’s Keystone XL Pipeline.  See Smith, supra note 21.
Notably, Domina was also counsel for the plaintiffs in Thompson v. Heineman,
289 Neb. 798, 857 N.W.2d 731 (2015).
23. Thompson, 289 Neb. 798, 857 N.W.2d 731.
24. Id. at 803, 857 N.W.2d at 740.
25. Id.  The Nebraska Sandhills are a unique environment where a thin layer of top-
soil covers large, fine-grained sand dunes. See CANDACE SAVAGE, PRAIRIE: A NAT-
URAL HISTORY 99–103 (Nancy Flight ed., 2004).  The sand deposits are a result of
glacial retreat after the last ice age. Id. Moderate activity disrupts the topsoil of
this sensitive ecosystem, effectively destroying the possibility of plant life. Id.
Even minimal surface activity can disrupt the topsoil of this sensitive ecosystem.
Id.  Some residents seem to fear burying a pipeline beneath such sensitive soil
could easily destroy the productivity of the land.
26. NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-1101 (Reissue 2010) (current version at NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 57-1101 (Cum. Supp. 2014)).
27. See Thompson, 289 Neb. at 803, 857 N.W.2d at 740.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 803–04, 857 N.W.2d at 739.
30. Id. at 802, 857 N.W.2d at 739.
31. Id. at 804, 857 N.W.2d at 741.
32. Id. at 805, 857 N.W.2d at 741.
33. Id. at 806, 857 N.W.2d at 742.
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longer active with the Department of State, and MOPSA would apply
to the Keystone XL Pipeline if TransCanada were to reapply for a
route across Nebraska.34  MOPSA was a political barrier the pipeline
might not circumvent.
To ease the application of MOPSA on the Keystone XL Pipeline,
the Unicameral amended MOPSA with L.B. 1161.35  L.B. 1161 al-
lowed a pipeline constructor to either seek approval from the PSC
under MOPSA for the construction of a pipeline or seek approval from
the Governor directly after following certain procedures.36  The
amendment also allowed the Nebraska Department of Environmental
Quality (DEQ) to seek its own findings on the environmental impact of
a proposed pipeline.37  If a carrier chooses to allow the DEQ to conduct
an independent survey, the pipeline carrier must reimburse the DEQ
for the procedure.38  L.B. 1161 was added to MOPSA in 2012.39  Be-
cause TransCanada found a pipeline route through the Sandhills
would be unacceptable, it provided a second option route for the pipe-
line in 2012.40  TransCanada collaborated with the DEQ to provide an
environmental impact report.41  Governor Heineman approved the
plan in 2013.42
Randy Thompson, Susan Straka, and Susan Dunavan then filed a
complaint against the Governor in the District Court of Lancaster
County.43  They asserted that the provisions in L.B. 1161 “violated the
Nebraska Constitution’s equal protection, due process, and separation
of powers provisions, and [the constitution’s] prohibition of special leg-
islation.”44  In the Nebraska District Court for Lancaster County,
Judge Stacy found the plaintiffs had standing as taxpayers of the
State of Nebraska.45  She went on to find L.B. 1161’s additions to Ne-
braska statutory law unconstitutional.46  The State of Nebraska ap-
pealed directly to the Nebraska Supreme Court.47  Nebraska’s highest
court divided to create an insufficient-majority of four judges and a
minority of three judges.48  While it is possible both the insufficient-
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 807, 857 N.W.2d at 742.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 808, 857 N.W.2d at 743.
39. Id. at 809, 857 N.W.2d at 743.
40. See id. at 809, 857 N.W.2d at 744.
41. Id. at 809–10, 857 N.W.2d at 744.
42. Id. at 810, 857 N.W.2d at 744.
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. Thompson v. Heineman, CI12-2060, 2014 WL 631609 at *11 (Neb. Dist. Ct. Feb.
19, 2014).
46. Id. at *35.
47. Thompson, 289 Neb. at 798, 857 N.W.2d at 731.
48. Id.
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majority and minority may have agreed on the merits of the constitu-
tional challenge, the opinions differed on how to apply Nebraska’s
standing law to the plaintiffs’ interest in this case.49  Each of the three
plaintiffs may have owned property in the proposed route, but the
plaintiffs never clearly asserted as much.50  Instead, the plaintiffs as-
serted “[l]and owned by [Thompson] was, or still is, in the path of one
or more proposed pipeline routes.”51  A majority of the Nebraska Su-
preme Court held L.B. 1161 unconstitutional.52  The three minority
judges opined the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue.53  Unfortu-
nately for the plaintiffs, the Nebraska State Constitution contains a
provision requiring five of the judges on the Nebraska Supreme Court
to overturn legislation as unconstitutional.54  Because three judges re-
fused to decide the issue of constitutionality due to their opinion on
the standing of the plaintiffs, the court could not overturn L.B. 1161.55
B. Constitutional Supermajority Requirement
Although a majority of the court in Thompson voted to overturn
L.B. 1161 as unconstitutional, the court upheld the law.  The unnatu-
ral situation where the minority opinion controls unsettles many law-
yers and academics.56  States do not regularly allow the opinion of the
minority to rule over the majority.57  However, the unusual
supermajority provision in the Nebraska State Constitution lead to
the opinion of the minority of judges to rule the constitutional issue in
Thompson.58  To comprehend the effect of the Nebraska Supreme
49. Id. at 848, 857 N.W.2d at 767.(Heavican, C.J., minority opinion).
50. See Appellees’ Opening Brief & Brief on Cross Appeal at 4, Thompson v. Heine-
man, 289 Neb. 798, 818 N.W.2d 731 (2015) (No. S-14-000158), 2014 WL 2997738,
at *4.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Thompson, 289 Neb. at 847, 857 N.W.2d at 766.
53. Id. at 861, 857 N.W.2d at 775 (Heavican, C.J., minority opinion).
54. NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2 (“No legislative act shall be held unconstitutional except
by the concurrence of five judges.”).
55. Thompson, 289 Neb. at 847, 857 N.W.2d at 766.
56. The criticism for supermajority provisions is widespread. See generally Entin,
supra note 13; Madgett, supra note 13; Riley, supra note 13.
57. See Jonathan Remy Nash, The Majority that Wasn’t: Stare Decisis, Majority Rule,
and the Mischief of Quorum Requirements, 58 EMORY L.J. 831 (2008) (describing
the role of majorities in judicial decision making and the danger of allowing mi-
norities to create rules of law).
58. Nebraska’s constitution specifically names its seven decision makers “judges,”
rather than the more traditional “justice.”  NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2 (“The Supreme
Court shall consist of seven judges, one of whom shall be the be the Chief Jus-
tice.”).  The abrogation from the conventional name was meant to follow the ex-
ample of Illinois.  For more on this and other eccentricities of the Nebraska State
Constitution see ROBERT D. MIEWALD, PETER J. LONGO, & ANTHONY B. SCHUTZ,
THE NEBRASKA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 217 (Univ. of Neb.
Press 2d ed., 2009) (1993).
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Court’s holding in Thompson, it is necessary to understand the poli-
cies underlying judicial supermajority provisions and how those poli-
cies have worked in past Nebraska litigation.
Constitutional provisions that require more than a majority of the
justices on a court to decide an issue are rare.59  Other than Nebraska,
only North Dakota has a similar requirement.60  “Minority-rule” cases
result from judicial supermajority provisions in state constitutions.61
Courts generally require a majority to decide issues.  States that have
judicial supermajority provisions in their constitutions take majority
rule to another level.  Where a plaintiff asks a state supreme court to
overturn legislation as unconstitutional, judicial supermajority provi-
sions require that more than a majority of the courts members agree
to strike it down.62  Nebraska added the constitutional supermajority
provision to its constitution after the state’s 1919–1920 constitutional
convention.63  It was largely modeled after a similar provision in the
Ohio constitution.64  The provision was part of the populist wave that
inundated the state at the time,65 and the provision has not changed
over time.66  Article V, Section 2 of the Constitution of the State of
Nebraska reads, “No legislative act shall be held unconstitutional ex-
cept by the concurrence of five judges.”  Proponents of such provisions
thought they gave power to the people by deferring to the acts of the
legislature.67  The court must be absolutely certain a provision is un-
constitutional to strike it down.68
Nebraska has not used its supermajority provision often.69  The
provision laid dormant in the state’s constitution for over half a cen-
tury.  But in the 1960’s the Supreme Court reached the kind of dead-
lock that triggers the provision.70  The court has never realized the
supermajority provision’s latent, havoc-wreaking potential the way
59. See generally Entin, supra note 13, at 468.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 443.
63. 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEBRASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1919–20, at 2824
(1920).
64. See Entin, supra note 13, at 468
65. See Riley, supra note 13, at 625.
66. Compare 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEBRASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
1919–20, at 2824 (1920), with NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2.
67. Riley, supra note 13, at 626; cf. Bessey v. Bd. of Educ. Lands & Funds, 185 Neb.
801, 804, 178 N.W.2d 794, 797 (1970) (“The Legislature, and not this court (as the
majority unsuccessfully opposed), specifies the protections to the trust.”).
68. See Entin, supra note 13, at 452 (“[T]he supermajority requirement was intended
to remind the supreme court that the people wanted the judiciary to show greater
deference to the legislature . . . .”).
69. See id. at 468.
70. Id. (citing DeBacker v. Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508 (1968)).
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other jurisdictions have.71  After its first use, the court followed the
supermajority provision in a handful of other cases,72 inspiring in-
tense criticism.73  Despite the forces against it, Nebraska’s
supermajority statute survives to provide controversial litigation from
generation to generation.
C. Nebraska’s Law on Standing to Sue
Nebraska’s supermajority provision was not the only element of
Nebraska law that influenced the court’s decision in Thompson.  Al-
though Nebraska standing doctrine is in many ways unremarkable
compared to the doctrine in other jurisdictions, the eccentricities of its
application played a key role in Thompson’s disposition.  Therefore, an
overview of the key cases in Nebraska’s law on standing to sue is vital
to understanding the difference between the insufficient-majority and
minority in Thompson.  After providing an outline of the major ele-
ments of Nebraska’s law on standing to sue, this Note will examine
the key cases that established each of the standing exceptions.
To have standing to sue, a plaintiff must have a legal or equitable
title or a personal interest in the issue he or she asks the court to
address.74  The doctrine relates to the court’s jurisdiction to address
the controversy the plaintiff presents.75  It requires that an individual
have a sufficient stake in the matter brought before the court to justify
the court’s intervention on his or her behalf.76  The plaintiff must
show that he or she is in danger of sustaining direct injury as a result
of anticipated action.77  Therefore, it is not sufficient for a plaintiff to
bring a grievance before the court in which he or she shares a general
interest in common with the entire public.78  However, the court has
71. Id. at 468–69; see infra subsection III.B.3 (discussing the disastrous effects of the
Ohio constitution’s supermajority provision).
72. DeBacker v. Sigler, 185 Neb. 352, 175 N.W.2d 912 (1970) (rejecting a constitu-
tional challenge to a statute classifying underage offenders); State ex rel. Belker
v. Bd. of Educ. Lands & Funds, 184 Neb. 621, 171 N.W.2d 156 (1969) (rejecting
constitutional challenge to a statute governing the sale of common school trust
land); DeBacker v. Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508 (1968) (rejecting a
challenge to a juvenile court statute).
73. See Madgett, supra note 13; Riley, supra note 13 (criticizing the “five judge rule”
as unpopular and impragmatic).
74. Ritchhart v. Daub, 256 Neb. 801, 805, 594 N.W.2d 288, 292 (1999).
75. Cotton v. Steele, 255 Neb. 892, 587 N.W.2d 693 (1999).
76. Ritchhart, 256 Neb. at 805, 594 N.W.2d at 292.
77. Id. at 806, 594 N.W.2d at 292.
78. Id.; see also Rexroad, Inc. v. S.I.D. No. 66, 222 Neb. 618, 386 N.W.2d 433 (1986)
(holding that garbage collector which had no office as place of business within
sanitary improvement district and was not taxpayer of district lacked standing to
contest validity of contract entered into between district and competitor for col-
lection of garbage in district); Neb. Sch. Dist. No. 148 v. Lincoln Airport Auth.,
220 Neb. 504, 371 N.W.2d 258 (1985) (holding that school district and taxpayer of
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recognized three exceptions to the law of standing.79  They include the
exception for a plaintiff asking for a writ of mandamus for a public
duty,80 the exception for matters of great public concern,81 and the
resident-taxpayer exception.82
The oldest of the exceptions to the doctrine of standing to sue is the
exception for a plaintiff that asks a public official to do some public
act.  The court adopted this exception in State ex rel. Ferguson v.
Shropshire.83  In that case, an Omaha justice of the peace moved his
office out of the precinct he was elected to serve.84  Functionally, this
justice of the peace was not able to serve the population that elected
him.85  Unfortunately, none of the people in the precinct of the justice
of the peace had a particular interest sufficient to sue.86  The Ne-
braska Supreme Court found an exception to the doctrine of standing
“[w]here the question is one of a public right, and the object of the
mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty” because the
people are the real party in interest.87  The exception has changed lit-
tle in over a century, and courts almost never find occasion to apply it
today.88
The second major exception to develop was for resident taxpayers.
The resident-taxpayer exception is by far the most used of the excep-
tions to the doctrine of standing to sue.  Its frequent use is possibly
attributable to the ease with which a plaintiff can fulfill its basic ele-
ments.  First, a plaintiff must establish that there has been a misap-
propriation of public funds.89  Second, the plaintiff must have made a
demand to the municipal or public corporation that was or would be
district did not have standing as resident taxpayers of municipality whose subdi-
vision made alleged illegal acquisition of real estate).
79. Dividing the exceptions into discrete legal doctrines is a point of contention be-
tween the insufficient-majority and minority. See infra note 123; infra subsection
III.A.2.
80. City of Crawford v. Darrow, 87 Neb. 494, 127 N.W. 891 (1910); Van Horn v. State
ex rel. Allen, 51 Neb. 232, 70 N.W. 941 (1897); State ex rel. Willard v. Stearns 11
Neb. 104, 7 N.W. 743 (1881); State ex rel. Ferguson v. Shropshire, 4 Neb. 411
(1876).
81. Cunningham v. Exon, 202 Neb. 563, 568, 276 N.W.2d 213, 216 (1979).
82. Project Extra Mile v. Neb. Liquor Control Comm’n, 283 Neb. 379, 391, 810
N.W.2d 149, 160 (2012); Chambers v. Lautenbaugh, 263 Neb. 920, 928, 644
N.W.2d 540, 548 (2002).
83. 4 Neb. at 414.
84. Id. at 411–312.
85. Id. at 412.
86. Id. at 413.
87. Id. at 414–15 (quoting JAMES L. HIGH, HIGH ON EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES § 341
(1874)).
88. See Thompson v. Heineman, 289 Neb. 798, 851, 857 N.W.2d 731, 769 (2015) (Hea-
vican, C.J., minority opinion) (“The [mandamus exception] has nearly been lost to
antiquity.”).
89. Chambers v. Lautenbaugh, 263 Neb. 920, 928, 644 N.W.2d 540, 548 (2002).
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ignored.90  Last, the plaintiff must show that the appropriation of
funds would otherwise go unchallenged because no other potential
party is better suited to bring the action.91  The most recent example
of  the use of the resident taxpayer exception is Project Extra Mile v.
Nebraska Liquor Control Commission.92  The plaintiffs alleged that
the state agency charged with regulating alcoholic beverages failed to
classify certain alcoholic beverages according to Nebraska’s stat-
utes.93  Consequently, these beverages were under-taxed.94  The regu-
lation’s tax advantages disincentivized all challengers who would
have had a personal stake in the matter.95  Because the court deter-
mined that under-taxation is a misappropriation of public funds and
that the commission would have ignored any demand the plaintiff
made, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs in Project
Extra Mile had sufficient standing to sue under the resident-taxpayer
exception.96
The last exception to the doctrine of standing to sue is for matters
of great public concern.  This exception has two essential elements.
First, the plaintiff’s complaint must address a matter that is in the
public interest.97  Second, for the exception to apply, no other party
can have standing to sue.98  If another party could have standing, the
court will only allow that other party to bring the action.99  The Ne-
braska Supreme Court adopted the exception in Cunningham v.
Exon.100  Other than Thompson, Cunningham is the only case in Ne-
braska legal history where the court found the exception to apply.101
In that case, the plaintiff challenged the process by which the legisla-
90. Id.
91. See Project Extra Mile v. Neb. Liquor Control Comm’n, 283 Neb. 379, 390–91, 810
N.W.2d 149, 160 (2012).
92. Id. at 391, 810 N.W.2d at 160.
93. Id. at 383, 810 N.W.2d at 155.
94. See id. at 382, 810 N.W.2d at 155.
95. Id. at 391–92, 810 N.W.2d at 160–61.
96. Id.
97. Cunningham v. Exon, 202 Neb. 563, 568, 276 N.W.2d 213, 215 (explaining the
standing exception for matters of great public concern as applied in Colorado,
Ohio, and Iowa).
98. See id. at 568, N.W.2d at 215 (quoting Howard v. City of Boulder, 290 P.2d 237
(1955)); see, e.g., Neb. Against Expanded Gambling, Inc. v. Neb. Horsemen’s
Ass’n., 258 Neb. 690, 605 N.W.2d 803 (2000) (refusing to grant standing to a non-
profit that opposed the telecasting of horse races); Green v. Cox Cable of Omaha,
Inc., 212 Neb. 915, 327 N.W.2d 603 (1982) (declining to extend the exception for
matters of great public concern to a plaintiff-municipality that entered a disad-
vantageous contract).
99. Cf. Cunningham, 202 Neb 563, 568, 276 N.W.2d 215.
100. Id. at 568, 276 N.W.2d at 216.
101. Thompson v. Heineman, 289 Neb. 798, 854, 857 N.W.2d 731, 771 (2015) (Heavi-
can, C.J., minority opinion) (“Cunningham is the only case in which we have ap-
plied this exception to the general rule of common-law standing . . . .”).
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ture amended the Nebraska State Constitution.102  His main concern
was that the ballot did not inform voters of how the amendment provi-
sions worked together.103  Despite the absence of misappropriated
funds, the court found an exception to the normal rules of standing.104
The amendment was a matter of public interest that may otherwise go
unchallenged.105  No individual in the community by herself had suffi-
cient interest to challenge the amendment.106
III. ANALYSIS
Understanding Thompson’s parties, their motives, and some of the
case’s underlying law is essential for analyzing the case’s outcome.
However, it is much more interesting to actually delve into the law at
issue in Thompson. Thompson’s insufficient-majority failed to apply
Nebraska’s law on standing and misunderstood how the four-judge
opinion should be applied in future cases.  The Thompson minority
better explains and protects Nebraska’s law on standing to sue.  Fur-
ther, the insufficient-majority tried but failed to accomplish a expan-
sion of the law of standing in Thompson.  Moreover, the insufficient-
majority in Thompson misunderstood how the supermajority require-
ment interacts with law and dicta.  Finally, Nebraska District Courts
should ignore the insufficient-majority’s addition to Nebraska law.
A. Minority’s Explanation Understands and Protects
Nebraska’s Law on Standing
Nebraska’s law of standing guards the courthouse doors from hear-
ing cases for which the court cannot provide a remedy.107  Standing is
a key jurisdictional element required for a court to exercise its juris-
diction.108  While three exceptions apply to the law of standing in Ne-
braska, the Nebraska’s Supreme Court has made it clear that these
exceptions should be applied carefully “to prevent the exceptions from
swallowing the rule.”109  The insufficient-majority did not explain the
law on standing correctly because it failed to narrowly apply the law’s
exceptions.  As discussed below, the importance of making jurisdic-
tional determinations first and the policies that underlie the law of
102. Cunningham, 202 Neb. at 566, 276 N.W.2d at 215.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 568–69, 276 N.W.2d at 216.
105. Id. at 568, 276 N.W.2d at 216.
106. See id.
107. State ex rel. Reed v. State Game & Parks Comm’n, 278 Neb. 564, 568, 773 N.W.2d
349, 354 (2009) (citing Lamar Co. v. City of Fremont, 278 Neb. 485, 771 N.W.2d
894 (2009)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 571, 773 N.W.2d at 355.
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standing demonstrate why the minority accurately characterized the
law.
1. Jurisdictional Requirements Should be Decided Before an
Opinion is Rendered
The insufficient-majority opines that a minority opinion on the
court’s lack of jurisdiction should not force the court to withhold a fur-
ther holding on pressing constitutional issues.110  However, the insuf-
ficient-majority’s opinion does not follow clearly from precedent.  For
example, the United States Supreme Court requires federal courts to
determine jurisdictional elements before reaching the merits of the
case.111  The Court insists that the idea is firmly rooted in the Ameri-
can form of government’s “separation of powers.”112  Nebraska’s gov-
ernment mirrors the national government in many ways, including
the state’s separation of powers between the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches.113  Consequently, following the U.S. Supreme
Court’s lead, the Nebraska Supreme Court has held on several occa-
sions that “it is the power and duty of an appellate court to determine
whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.”114  The minority
notes the importance of jurisdictional requirements by refusing to de-
cide a case for which they thought the court lacked jurisdiction.115  In
view of the ambiguity, the minority was reasonable not to recognize
standing based on lack of jurisdiction.
2. Underlying Policies of the Law of Standing Are Closer to the
Minority
In view of the minority’s insistence that it was their “power and
duty” to determine jurisdiction before deciding a constitutional issue,
this Note investigates the specific jurisdictional element the minority
claims to protect—the law on standing to sue.  As discussed below,
110. Thompson v. Heineman, 289 Neb. 798, 847, 857 N.W.2d 731, 766 (2015) (Con-
nolly, J., insufficient-majority opinion) (“We reject the dissent’s interpretation of
this provision as requiring five of the seven members of this court to concur on
jurisdictional requirements to hear a case, in addition to requiring five judges to
concur that a legislative enactment is unconstitutional.”).
111. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (explaining how
reaching jurisdictional elements before the merits of a case is fundamental to the
“separation of powers”).
112. Id.
113. NEB. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The powers of the government of this state are
divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive, and
judicial . . . .”).
114. In re Sean H., 271 Neb. 395, 398, 711 N.W.2d 879, 882 (2006) (citing Malolepszy
v. State, 270 Neb. 100, 699 N.W.2d 387 (2005)); Smith v. Lincoln Meadows Home-
owners Ass’n, Inc., 267 Neb. 849, 851, 678, N.W.2d 726, 729 (2004).
115. Thompson, 289 Neb. at 849, 857 N.W.2d at 767 (Heavican, C.J., minority
opinion).
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this subsection outlines the basic requirements of the law on standing
to sue and the policy behind its limited exceptions.  It further details
the assertions of the parties, and the insufficient-majority’s politically-
charged response.  Lastly, this subsection discusses how the Thomp-
son minority’s principled reaction to the insufficient-majority’s argu-
ments is a better application of the jurisdiction law of standing to sue.
Standing to sue is required for any court to exercise its jurisdic-
tion.116  Its basic elements are not difficult to grasp.  To be able to
invoke the court’s power, a party must have a legal or equitable inter-
est of some kind in the controversy.117  Therefore, to be able to sue, a
party must have a personal stake in the suit’s outcome.118  Generally,
an interest that is shared with the public at large is not enough.119
The reason for this requirement is simple: adversarial parties ensure
that a court is not issuing an advisory opinion120 and that the judici-
ary does not become a lawmaking institution.121  Therefore, the judi-
cial doctrine of standing enforces the Nebraska State Constitution’s
“separation of powers” provisions.122  However, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court has indisputably recognized two exceptions to the stand-
ing requirement: the resident-taxpayer exception and the exception
for matters of great public concern.123  The rationale for both is to al-
low the court to apply justice even if no other party has sufficient in-
terest to have traditional standing.124  The resident-taxpayer
116. State ex rel. Reed v. State Game & Parks Comm’n, 278 Neb. 564, 568, 773 N.W.2d
349, 353 (2009); Ritchhart v. Daub, 256 Neb. 801, 805, 594 N.W.2d 288, 291–92
(1999).
117. Ritchhart, 256 Neb. 801, 805, 594 N.W.2d 288, 292.
118. Id.
119. Neb. Sch. Dist. No. 148 v. Lincoln Airport Auth., 220 Neb. 504, 506–07, 371
N.W.2d 258, 261 (1985).
120. See Thompson, 289 Neb. at 848–49, 857 N.W.2d at 767 (Heavican, C.J., minority
opinion) (introducing the doctrine underlying the law of standing by saying “[i]t is
not the office of this court to render advisory opinions.”).
121. Amy J. Wildermuth & Lincoln L. Davis, Standing, on Appeal, 2010 U. ILL. L.
REV. 957, 997 (2010) (describing the rational for the doctrine of standing in fed-
eral courts on which much of Nebraska’s law on standing is based).
122. Id.; see also NEB. CONST. art. II, § 1 (enumerating the Nebraska State Constitu-
tion’s separation of powers provision).
123. Note the insufficient-majority and the minority disagree on the characterization
of the law of standing.  The minority finds three historic exceptions to the law of
standing to sue, whereas the insufficient-majority divides the exceptions into
only two categories: the exception for matters of great public concern and the
resident taxpayer exception. Compare Thomspson, 289 Neb. at 814–15, 857
N.W.2d at 747 (Connolly, insufficient-majority opinion) with id. at 851, 857
N.W.2d at 768–69 (Heavican, C.J., minority opinion). The insufficient-majority
contends the exception for matters of great public concern is also known as the
“public interest exception.” See id. at 846, 857 N.W.2d at 765.
124. See, e.g., Project Extra Mile v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm’n, 283 Neb., 379,
391, 810 N.W.2d 149, 160 (2012); State ex rel. Reed v. State Game & Parks
Comm’n, 278 Neb. 564, 571, 773 N.W.2d 349, 355 (2009); Chambers v.
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exception allows a citizen to sue a government official for misappropri-
ating public resources if the citizen has made a demand that was re-
fused or ignored125 and the government official’s action would
otherwise go unchallenged.126  The exception for matters of great pub-
lic concern allows a party to gain standing to sue for a matter affecting
the public interest only if no one else has standing to sue.127  The
court limits both exceptions to cases where no other party with the
incentive to sue would have standing.128  The limitation demonstrates
the court’s commitment to the separation of powers rationale for judi-
cial standing doctrine.
The Thompson appellees tried to fit into the existing exceptions to
gain standing to sue.129  Because the plaintiffs did not allege a per-
sonal stake in the dispute, they argued that the resident-taxpayer ex-
ception applied.130  Plaintiffs may have owned land in the path of the
proposed pipeline, which would have given them standing to sue.131
However, the Brief for the Appellees did not clearly set out this
fact.132  The minority noted the appellees’ lack of clarity in their anal-
ysis.133  Apparently the appellees were so confident in their claim
under the resident-taxpayer exception, they did not feel the need to
gain direct standing to sue by clarifying the extent of Mr. Thompson’s
or another plaintiff’s land holdings in the pipeline’s path.134  Conse-
quently, the insufficient-majority and the minority properly noted
that the appellees failed to qualify directly for standing to sue.
While the insufficient-majority and the minority both recognized
the deficiencies in the appellees’ argument for standing, they handled
the deficiency differently.  The insufficient-majority would grant the
court jurisdiction through an expansion to the exception for matters of
Lautenbaugh, 263 Neb. 920, 928, 644 N.W.2d 540, 548 (2002); Cunningham v.
Exon, 202 Neb. 563, 568, 276 N.W.2d 213, 216 (1979).
125. Chambers, 263 Neb. at 928, 644 N.W.2d at 548.
126. Project Extra Mile, 283 Neb. at 391, 810 N.W.2d at 160.
127. Cunningham, 202 Neb. at 568, 276 N.W.2d at 216.
128. See, e.g., Project Extra Mile, 283 Neb. at 391, 810 N.W.2d at 160; State ex rel.
Reed, 278 Neb. at 571, 773 N.W.2d at 355; Chambers, 263 Neb. at 928, 644
N.W.2d at 548; Cunningham, 202 Neb. at 568, 276 N.W.2d at 216.
129. Appellees’ Opening Brief & Brief on Cross Appeal at 9–10, Thompson v. Heine-
man, 289 Neb. 798, 818 N.W.2d 731 (2015) (No. S-14-000158), 2014 WL 2997738,
at *9–10.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 4, 2010 WL 2997738, at *4.
132. Id. (“Land owned by [Thompson] was, or still is, in the path of one or more pro-
posed pipeline routes . . . .”).
133. Thompson, 289 Neb. at 857, 857 N.W.2d at 772 (Heavican, C.J., minority opinion)
(“Indeed, one or more of the appellees may have a direct interest sufficient to
establish traditional standing but simply failed to prove it.”).
134. See Appellees’ Opening Brief & Brief on Cross Appeal, at 9–10, Thompson v.
Heineman, 289 Neb. 798, 857 N.W.2d 731 (2015) (No. S-14-000158), 2014 WL
2997738, at *9–10.
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great public concern.135  They argue that the exception for matters of
great public concern protects constitutional claims in a special way.136
The minority found no such expansion.137  As discussed below, al-
though the insufficient-majority’s argument for expanding the excep-
tion to the law of standing for matters of great public concern is well
meaning, the minority is correct in asserting that the exception ulti-
mately dissolves the law on standing altogether.
The insufficient-majority desires to expand the exception for mat-
ters of great public concern to protect the constitutional rights of Ne-
braska citizens.138  Its analysis begins by incorrectly defining the
exceptions to standing doctrine.  While the minority finds three excep-
tions,139 the insufficient-majority finds only two.140  They insist that
the exception for matters of great public concern is rooted in nine-
teenth- and twentieth-century mandamus cases.141  They posit that
public protection of rights is the motivating policy behind the excep-
tion.142  Therefore, the insufficient-majority proposes to expand the
exception to align the exception’s application to its purpose.143  After
all, property rights are central to an individual’s identity.144  What
matter could be of greater public concern than protecting a Nebras-
kan’s right to his or her identity?  The insufficient-majority opines
that the risk of the loss of property rights through unconstitutional
eminent domain is great enough concern to the public to warrant us-
ing the exception.145
The minority understands the history of Nebraska’s law on stand-
ing to sue more clearly.  By outlining three historical exceptions to the
135. Thompson, 289 Neb. at 857, 857 N.W.2d at 772 (Heavican, C.J., minority
opinion).
136. Id. at 824, 857 N.W.2d at 753 (Connolly, J., insufficient-majority opinion) (“If the
exercise of eminent domain over private property and the constitutional require-
ments for the organization of state government do not raise matters of great pub-
lic concern, then no issue could . . . .”).
137. Id. at 859, 857 N.W.2d at 773 (Heavican, C.J., minority opinion) (“The plurality’s
new and expansive interpretation of the exception for matters of great public con-
cern consumes the time-honored common-law rule in a single gulp.”).
138. Id. at 823–24, 857 N.W.2d at 752 (Connolly, J., insufficient-majority opinion).
139. Id. at 851, 857 N.W.2d at 768 (Heavican, C.J., minority opinion) (“We have recog-
nized three exceptions to traditional standing . . . .”).
140. Id. at 818, 857 N.W.2d at 749 (Connolly, J., insufficient-majority opinion) (“The
‘great public concern’ exception is another name for the ‘public interest’ exception
that we recognized in our early mandamus cases.”).
141. Id. (“[I]n our early mandamus cases, we distinguished between private rights and
the public’s interest and held that a plaintiff has standing to enforce a public
right.”) (citing State ex rel. Ferguson v. Shropshire, 4 Neb. 411 (1876)).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See Alexander, supra note 6 (asserting the connection between property rights
and human flourishing).
145. Thompson, 289 Neb. at 822, 857 N.W.2d at 751.
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requirement of having personal stake in the dispute, the minority is
more faithful to the constitutional doctrine.  Like the insufficient-ma-
jority, the minority finds that Nebraska courts have recognized excep-
tions to standing doctrine for resident taxpayers and matters of great
public concern.146  However, the minority goes on to acknowledge an-
other historic exception.147  In the early years of the Nebraska Su-
preme Court, the court recognized an exception to the law of standing
for a litigant who sought a writ of mandamus against a public official
to enforce a public duty.148  The minority insists this exception is
unique from the other two exceptions.149  As the minority points out,
the court recognized the exception separately in the past:
In the 19th and early 20th centuries, this court discussed an exception to the
requirement that a litigant have a personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
versy.  We stated that if the question was one of a public right and the object
of mandamus was to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people were
regarded as the real party in interest.  In that situation, the individual bring-
ing the action, the relator, did not need to show that he had any legal or spe-
cial interest in the result.150
Because the appellees in Thompson did not seek to force a public offi-
cial to perform a public duty, the minority correctly assessed this ex-
ception did not apply.151
While the insufficient-majority’s importation of the mandamus ex-
ception into the exception for matters of great public concern describes
the evolution of the exceptions to Nebraska’s law of standing, it does
not describe the law.  The two exceptions developed distinctly at very
different times in Nebraska history.  The court expressly adopted the
exception for matters of great public concern in 1979.152  However, the
first appearance of the exception for mandamus to enforce a public
duty was over a century prior.153  Although the exception for manda-
mus to enforce a public duty may have influenced the court’s willing-
ness to adopt the exception for matters of great public concern,
insisting the two are one in the same is simply incorrect.
This mischaracterization of the law is fundamental to the insuffi-
cient-majority’s error.  All of the modern exceptions to the law of
146. Id. at 851, 857 N.W.2d at 769 (Heavican, C.J., minority opinion).
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., City of Crawford v. Darrow, 87 Neb. 494, 127 N.W. 891 (1910); Van Horn
v. State ex rel. Allen, 51 Neb. 232, 70 N.W. 941 (1897); State ex rel. Willard v.
Stearns, 11 Neb. 104, 7 N.W. 743 (1881); State ex rel. Ferguson v. Shropshire, 4
Neb. 411 (1876).
149. Thompson, 289 Neb. at 851–52, 857 N.W.2d at 769.
150. State ex rel. Reed v. State Game & Parks Comm’n, 278 Neb. 564, 571, 773 N.W.2d
349, 355 (2009).
151. Thompson, 289 Neb. at 851–52, 857 N.W.2d at 769.
152. Cunningham v. Exon, 202 Neb. 563, 567–68, 276 N.W.2d 213, 215–16 (1979) (“An
exception to the general rule relied upon by defendants has been established in
other jurisdictions where matters of great public concern are involved . . . .”).
153. Ferguson, 4 Neb. 411 (1876).
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standing require that no other party be able to raise the claim the
plaintiff asserts or that another party that could raise the claim the
plaintiff asserts but lack the incentive to do so.154  The appellees in
Thompson did not meet this criteria.  The minority correctly notes
that various other parties could challenge L.B. 1161, including
Nebraskans whose land was actually condemned to construct the Key-
stone XL Pipeline.155  Further, if the citizens of the State of Nebraska
were concerned that the act ignores their rights, they could have peti-
tioned the attorney general to seek a declaratory judgment from the
Nebraska Supreme Court invalidating the law.156
The projected route of the Keystone XL Pipeline through Nebraska
crosses a substantial portion of the state’s land.157  Each of the indi-
vidual landowners along that route would have a particularized inter-
est in L.B. 1161’s constitutionality.158  To create the easement
through their land, the actual landowners stand to lose a stick in their
bundle of property rights.159  Although each appellee was a “resident
and a taxpayer” of Nebraska,160 they do not have the type of interest
the law of standing requires to seek a court to exercise its
jurisdiction.161
While the insufficient-majority is correct to espouse that the “Sal-
vation of the State is Watchfulness in the Citizen,”162 their political
zeal ignores an interesting caveat of Nebraska law that enables
Nebraskans to vigilantly guard their rights.  When the legislature
passes a law that seems facially unconstitutional, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court has allowed the attorney general to seek a declaratory
judgment against the law:
In equity, as in the law court, the Attorney General has the right, in cases
where the property of the sovereign or the interests of the public are directly
154. See Project Extra Mile v. Neb. Liquor Control Comm’n, 283 Neb. 379, 391, 810
N.W.2d 149, 160 (2012) (“But the taxpayer must show that the official’s unlawful
failure to comply with a duty to tax would otherwise go unchallenged because no
other potential party is better suited to bring the action.”); Cunningham, 202
Neb. at 568, 276 N.W.2d at 216 (reasoning that a party has standing under the
exception if “no one may have standing to challenge it”).
155. Thompson, 289 Neb. at 857, 857 N.W.2d at 772.
156. See State ex rel. Meyer v. Peters, 188 Neb. 817, 199 N.W.2d 738 (1972); State ex
rel. Sorensen v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 123 Neb. 259, 242 N.W.
609 (1932).
157. Route Maps, TRANSCANADA: KEYSTONE XL, http://www.keystone-xl.com/home/key
stone-xl-kxl-oil-pipeline-maps/ [https://perma.unl.edu/YK33-3E79] (providing a
map of the proposed pipeline’s route).
158. Thompson, 289 Neb. at 857, 857 N.W.2d at 772.
159. Id.
160. Appellees’ Opening Brief & Brief on Cross Appeal at 9, Thompson v. Heineman,
289 Neb. 798, 857 N.W.2d 731 (2015) (No. S-14-000158), 2014 WL 2997738, at *9.
161. See Ritchhart v. Daub, 256 Neb. 801, 805–06, 594 N.W.2d 288, 292 (1999).
162. Thompson, 289 Neb. at 824, 857 N.W.2d at 752 (quoting the inscription above the
entrance to Nebraska’s state capitol).
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concerned, to institute suit by what may be called ‘civil information’ for their
protection.  The state is not left without redress in its own courts, because no
private citizen chooses to encounter the difficulty of defending it.163
Nebraskans need not rely on a “caped crusader” of the courtroom to
protect them from unconstitutional laws.  The attorney general has
standing to challenge unconstitutional laws.164  By neglecting to ac-
knowledge the attorney general’s role, the insufficient-majority would
force Nebraskans to resort to litigious vigilantism.165
B. Minority’s Supermajority Interpretation Mirrors the
Court’s Past Application
Because the insufficient-majority’s opinion allows the exception to
“swallow the rule,”166 a lower court may be disinclined to follow it.
Due to the supermajority provision of the Nebraska State Constitu-
tion, these courts might not have to do so.167  This section discusses
how cases from Nebraska and other jurisdictions with constitutional
supermajority provisions might allow lower courts to relegate the in-
sufficient-majority’s holding on standing to the mere dicta of a dissent.
The insufficient-majority’s rule on the exception to the law of standing
for matters of great public concern is too impractical for a lower court
to apply.  Courts are bound to holdings but guided by dicta.  Lastly,
historic cases demonstrate that any rule from a case where a
supermajority provision has been evoked is not necessarily the bind-
ing rule of the court.  The circumstances surrounding Thompson sug-
gest the insufficient-majority’s findings on standing to be more a
political anomaly than transformative law.
163. State ex rel. Meyer v. Peters, 188 Neb. 817, 819–20, 199 N.W.2d 738, 740 (1972)
(quoting State v. Pac. Express Co., 80 Neb. 823, 115 N.W. 619 (1908)).
164. Id.
165. Admittedly, Nebraska Attorney General Jon Bruning was unlikely to respond to
any landowner’s request to find L.B. 1161 unconstitutional because of his fervent
support of the legislation in court and his political affiliation. See Amy Harder,
Lawsuit by Nebraska Landowners May Decide Keystone Pipeline’s Fate, WALL
STREET J. (Nov. 20, 2014, 2:13 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/lawsuit-by-ne-
braska-landowners-may-decide-keystone-pipelines-fate-1416508187 (discussing
how Republicans, like Governor Dave Heineman and Attorney General Jon Brun-
ing, fought together to defend the TransCanada’s plan for a pipeline’s path
through Nebraska).  However, the point remains that the landowners did not
demonstrate to the court an attempt to contact the Attorney General so he might
challenge the law on behalf of all Nebraskans.
166. Cf. Thompson, 289 Neb. at 851, 857 N.W.2d at 768 (quoting State ex rel. Reed v.
State Game & Parks Comm’n, 278 Neb. 564, 571, 773 N.W.2d 349, 355 (2009)).
167. NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2 (“No legislative act shall be held unconstitutional except
by the concurrence of five judges.”).
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1. Insufficient-Majority Provides An Impracticable Rule on
Standing
While the judges in the insufficient-majority reason that the result
they advocate flows from a nuanced application of the exceptions to
Nebraska’s standing doctrine,168 the relevant case law and policies
driving it seem to contradict these judges’ reasoning.169  However, the
insufficient-majority opinion does align with a movement to remove
standing barriers to the courthouse doors.170  Scholars who advocate
eliminating standing as a barrier to justiciability see the doctrine as a
significant restriction to justice.171  They see the doctrine as a judi-
cially applied wall that shuts real issues out of courts due to a judge’s
political distaste for the case.172  The insufficient-majority’s agree-
ment with these scholars would explain much of their opinion’s
exasperation.173  The plaintiffs’ claim that the Unicameral unconsti-
tutionally delegated eminent domain power is so meritorious that the
not even a lack of a “horse in the race” should keep the issue from the
judge’s ears.174  However, if the insufficient-majority intended to relax
Nebraska’s standing doctrine for the sake of justice, a constitutional
case that required a judicial supermajority was not the best moment
to do so.  Without a concurrence of five judges on the constitutional
issue, the court would have no guarantee of how lower courts will ap-
ply any subordinate proposition an insufficient-majority opinion.175
168. Thompson, 289 Neb. at 823, 857 N.W.2d at 751 (quoting Project Extra Mile v.
Neb. Liquor Control Comm’n, 283 Neb. 379, 391, 810 N.W.2d 149, 160 (2012))
(“[W]e have recognized taxpayer standing because ‘[a] good deal of unlawful gov-
ernment action would otherwise go unchallenged.’ . . . The same reasoning ap-
plies here.”).
169. See supra subsection III.A.2.
170. See Heather Elliot, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 463–64 (ex-
plaining the failure of standing doctrine to functionally serve any purpose); Wil-
dermuth & Davis, supra note 121, at 960 (“[A]gencies increasingly have been able
to insulate the substance of their decision making based on standing—basically, a
procedural device . . . .”) (emphasis added).
171. See, e.g., Wildermuth & Davis, supra note 121, at 960; Elliot, supra note 170, at
461.
172. See Wildermuth & Davis, supra note 121, at 961 (“[J]udges will use standing as a
subterfuge to make results-oriented decisions without admitting they have done
so.”).
173. Thompson, 289 Neb. at 847–48, 857 N.W.2d at 766–67 (“We believe that Ne-
braska citizens deserve a decision on the merits.  But the super-majority require-
ment of article V, § 2, coupled with the dissent’s refusal to reach the merits,
means that the citizens cannot get a binding decision from this court.”).
174. Id. at 823, 857 N.W.2d at 752 (explaining how eliminating the public’s constitu-
tional rights is a matter of great public concern such that the exception should
apply).
175. The insufficient-majority admits that lower courts may be uncertain of how to
apply their holding issue. See id. at 828, 857 N.W.2d at 755.  See infra subsection
III.B.3 describing lower courts in Ohio that refused to follow issues decided in
cases requiring a judicial supermajority.
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Although well-meaning, the insufficient-majority’s relaxation of
standing requirements fails the constitutional motivation for the pol-
icy: separation of powers.  Voices that promote moving away from the
strict application of standing usually account for the doctrine’s princi-
ple rationale.176  The insufficient-majority did not.  Instead of an-
nouncing a departure from the traditional standing doctrine, the
insufficient-majority attempted to expand an existing exception.177
Consequently, the court was no longer applying justice to aggrieved
parties but rather skillfully applying Nebraska’s constitution to L.B.
1161 as if the court were an arm of the Unicameral.  Therefore, the
insufficient-majority’s expansion to the standing doctrine’s exception
for matters of great public concern may cause as many constitutional
violations as it prevents.  Thus, insufficient-majority’s holding on the
exceptions to the law on standing to sue is impracticable because it
fails protect the separation of powers.
2. Asserting the Difference Between Holding and Dicta
Much of the doctrine of stare decisis is built on the distinction be-
tween holding and dicta.178  Even when a judge calls a proposition a
holding, the binding effect of the proposition on other courts is not
always altogether clear.179  This ambiguity is apparent in cases like
Thompson, where a proposition the court addresses to reach the mer-
its of a case has little to do with the injury for which the plaintiffs
sought redress.180  Generally, the doctrine of stare decisis regards a
condition that is necessary for a court to reach its conclusion as a hold-
ing.181  Because the insufficient-majority’s proposition on standing
was necessary for the court to reach the merits of the case, other
courts may not be bound by the proposition.  The insufficient-majority
retaliates to this conclusion decisively: “[T]he supermajority provision
is a voting requirement on the resolution of the case—as distinguished
from a preliminary requirement that merely determines whether the
court can take action.”182  Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to con-
clude that the doctrine of stare decisis and Nebraska’s constitutional
176. See Elliot, supra note 170, at 463–64 (demonstrating how the traditional doctrine
of standing fails to support its main rationale and developing alternatives that
may support the separation of powers better); Wildermuth & Davis, supra note
121 (formulating a variety of ways courts can relax the doctrine of standing while
preserving the separation of powers).
177. See Thompson, 289 Neb. at 823–24, 857 N.W.2d at 752.
178. Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953,
955 (2005).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1026 (“[A] proposition that is necessary to the disposition (or, by extension,
to another holding) itself must count as a holding.”).
182. Thompson, 289 Neb. at 828, 857 N.W.2d at 755.
570 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:548
supermajority provision invalidates the Thompson insufficient-major-
ity’s holding on standing exceptions.  Regardless, the political nature
of the opinion coupled with the unusual division of judges on the Court
should be sufficient to distinguish the Thompson insufficient-major-
ity’s holding on standing from subsequent cases.
3. Cases from Nebraska’s Past and Ohio Prove Illustrative
The Nebraska State Constitution’s judicial supermajority provi-
sion has not impacted the court’s decision in many cases.  In fact, the
court has only resorted to the provision a handful of times in Ne-
braska legal history183.  Only one case retried a constitutional issue,
State ex rel. Belker v. Board of Education Land and Funds.184  While
none of the judges changed their opinion on the constitutionality of the
law at issue, the opinion of the court followed the constitutional rule
the original case’s minority set forth.185  As a result, the court upheld
twice a rule of law the minority of the judges decided.  Some subse-
quent jurisprudence was even set around contravening the inconve-
nient rule of the minority.186  Nebraska has been fortunate to have
such a clean history with the state’s supermajority requirement.  Pre-
cedent from other states suggests that a lower court might be able to
disregard a case decided through a supermajority statute
altogether.187
Ohio is the classic example of lower court confusion,188 where that
state suffered massive confusion as a result of it supermajority re-
quirement.189  After an unpopular decision in DeWitt v. State ex rel.
Crabbe,190 many lower courts were reluctant to follow the state high
court’s precedent.191  The Ohio legislature passed a workers’ compen-
sation statute that required all employers of more than five employees
183. See, e.g., id. at 798, 875 N.W.2d at 731; State ex rel. Spire v. Beermann, 235 Neb.
384, 455 N.W.2d 749 (1990) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to legislation
that transferred a state college to the University of Nebraska); State ex rel.
Belker v. Bd. of Educ. Lands & Funds, 184 Neb. 621, 171 N.W.2d 156 (1969)
(rejecting constitutional challenge to a statute governing the sale of common
school trust land); DeBacker v. Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508 (1968)
(rejecting a constitutional challenge to a statute classifying underage offenders).
184. 185 Neb. 270, 175 N.W.2d 63 (1970).
185. Id.
186. Bessey v. Bd. of Educ. Lands & Funds, 185 Neb. 801, 803, 178 N.W.2d 794, 796
(1970) (“[T]he very contention of the majority of this court that ultimate supervi-
sory power over the sale of these lands was curtly and almost summarily rejected
by the controlling minority in Belker.”).
187. See Entin, supra note 13, at 455 (describing Ohio courts of appeals that refused to
follow the judgment of cases involving supermajority requirements).
188. Id.
189. Id. (explaining the confusion that resulted from the Ohio Supreme Court ruling
on a controversial workers’ compensation issue).
190. 141 N.E. 551 (Ohio 1923).
191. See Entin, supra note 13, at 455.
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to pay for workers’ compensation insurance.192  If a business used an
independent contractor, the business was not responsible to pay for
the workers’ compensation premiums of the independent contractor’s
employees.193  Problems arose when both an independent contractor
and the business that hired it failed to pay for worker’s compensation
insurance.194  In DeWitt, a minority of the Ohio Supreme Court up-
held an act that allowed the State to seek damages for the cost of
workers’ compensation from a business that used the services of an
independent contractor.195  The damages were allowed only if both the
business and the independent contractor failed to pay for workers’
compensation insurance.196  Naturally, the court’s holding uneased
many Ohio businesses.197  Lower courts did not understand which
opinion bound them.198  Some courts even refused to follow the Ohio
Supreme Court’s decision.199  The insubordination led the Ohio Su-
preme Court to overturn its decision just five years later.200  An attor-
ney may argue for Nebraska district courts to do the same.
The ambiguity the constitutional supermajority leaves after the
court’s decision in Thompson clouds the status of the law of standing
in Nebraska.  If an attorney needed to argue her opponent lacked
standing based on the matter of great public concern exception to the
standing requirement, she could draw precedent set forth in Belker to
argue the majority’s approach to standing is binding on the court.  She
would have to assert the standing requirement was a necessary condi-
tion to the court’s decision in Thompson.201  Her opponent could try to
separate constitutional decisions from preliminary ones, like the in-
sufficient-majority.202  The extent of the exception to the law of stand-
ing for matters of great public concern is now questionable.  However,
it would be unusual for anyone to find themselves in the position of
the parties in Thompson.  The plaintiff would have to lack traditional
standing, and not fit squarely into any of the three established excep-
tions.  The exception for matters of great public concern would have to
192. DeWitt, 141 N.E. at 553 (Jones, J., insufficient-majority) (enumerating the spe-
cific details of Ohio’s Workmen’s Compensation Act).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 564 (Allen, J., minority opinion) (asserting the minority opinion bound the
lower courts).
197. See Entin, supra note 13, at 455.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See State ex rel. Brendwell v. Hershner, 161 N.E. 334 (Ohio 1928).
201. See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 178, at 1026.
202. Thompson v. Heineman, 289 Neb. 798, 827, 857 N.W.2d 731, 755 (2015) (“The
dissent, however, does not have four votes for its constitutional interpretation,
and we, the majority, conclude that the dissent’s interpretation is not warranted
and, in any event, is not controlling.”).
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be the last recourse of a desperate plaintiff.  In short, the extent of the
exception for matters of great public concern may not come up again,
and as a result, Thompson is likely more a political anomaly than
transformative law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The circumstances surrounding the plans for the Keystone XL
Pipeline almost seem more appropriate for the armchair juries of
prime-time television.  The drama is uncanny.  Emotions run high in
an odd clash of political and traditional interests.  Environmentalists
have combined with farmers to combat the construction of a pipeline
designed to quench American’s addiction to oil.  In this dizzying array
of law and politics, any legal thinker can easily lose himself.  By exam-
ining the background of the case, Nebraska’s judicial supermajority
requirement, and Nebraska’s law on standing to sue, it is possible to
see how the insufficient-majority misunderstood the law of standing.
In Thompson v. Heineman, the insufficient-majority tried to apply the
exception for matters of great public concern to plaintiffs who did not
merit it.  With land, the environment and the nation’s oil economy at
stake, four of the seven judges let compassion rule their decision in a
way Nebraska’s standing doctrine does not allow.  Instead, the
Thompson minority correctly applied Nebraska’s judicial doctrine of
standing to sue because they found that exceptions to the law of stand-
ing only apply when there is no other suitable party to seek the juris-
diction of the court.
On November 6, 2015, President Obama rejected TransCanada’s
attempts to build the Keystone XL Pipeline.203  However, until the
moment the President announced his plans, Nebraska landowners
never gave up their attempts to combat L.B. 1161.204  Sixty Nebras-
kans who own land in the way of the pipeline planned to further chal-
lenge the statute in court.205  They refused to relinquish a stick in
their bundle of rights without a fight.206  They should not have to.
After all, it is their rights at issue.  These owners have a personal
stake in the litigation they pursued.  Their land and the identity that
goes with it were stake.  They would have had the right to pursue re-
course in court for an unconstitutional delegation of eminent domain
203. Press Release, The White House, Statement of the President on the Keystone
Pipeline (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/06/
statement-president-keystone-xl-pipeline [https://perma.unl.edu/UTX7-269U].
204. Nicolas Bergin, TransCanada Could Face Long Legal Battle despite Surprise
Play, LINCOLN J. STAR, (Oct. 7, 2015), http://journalstar.com/news/national/trans-
canada-could-face-long-legal-battle-despite-surprise-play/article_0df424bf-6b08-
5bb8-9af8-6c816322a1c0.html [https://perma.unl.edu/JD77-FL7Q].
205. Id.
206. See di Robilant, supra note 9, at 877 (explaining the comparison of property
rights to a “bundle of sticks”).
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power.  However, the court cannot manufacture parties when the Uni-
cameral passes a statute that might be unconstitutional.  The Ne-
braska Supreme Court does not issue advisory opinions.207  The
insufficient-majority’s holding on standing relaxed the exceptions to
law of standing to sue in Nebraska.  They may have even “let the ex-
ception swallow the rule.”208  Who knows if the relaxation will carry to
lower courts?  The court decided Thompson under anomalous political
circumstances, but only time will tell whether insufficient-majority’s
expansion of standing exceptions will be transformative law.
207. Thompson, 289 Neb. at 848–49, 857 N.W.2d at 767 (Heavican, C.J., minority
opinion) (“It is not the office of this court to render advisory opinions.”).
208. Id.
